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The controlling norms of international law forbid military in-
tervention in the affairs of other nations. Judged by this standard 
of behavior, the history of United States involvement in Central 
America has been a history of lawlessness. Between 1854 and 1990, 
U.S. troops have invaded Panama seven times, Nicaragua six times, 
Honduras four times, and Guatemala and the Dominican Republic 
once each. l This pattern of U.S. military intervention underscores 
the U.S. government's habitual disrespect for Central American 
sovereignty. Remarkably, international law has never held the 
United States accountable for violation of other nations' sovereignty 
by its own troops. 
In 1984, however, Nicaragua forced the United States to answer 
at international law for its illegal covert activities in that country. It 
sued the United States in the International Court of Justice (I.C.].) 
for damages arising from U.S. covert attempts to overthrow the 
Sandinista regime. 2 In its complaint, Nicaragua alleged that it had 
suffered over $370 million in damages stemming from the activities 
of the U.S.-backed Contra rebels and from the Central Intelligence 
Agency (CIA) mining of Nicaragua's harbors.3 Nicaragua asserted 
that these U.S. activities violated the principle of non-intervention 
in the affairs of sovereign states,4 making the United States liable 
at international law for the damages it had caused to Nicaragua. 5 
The United States argued in response to the complaint that the 
I.C.]. had no jurisdiction over the suit.6 When the I.C.]. rejected 
the U.S. position, the United States withdrew from participation in 
the suit. 7 After hearing Nicaragua's argument on the merits of the 
case, the I.C.]. found against the United States on each count of 
the complaint.8 Although the I.C.]. held that the United States has 
I See Lopez, North American Interventionism in CONFLICT IN NICARAGUA 53, 65-66 (]. 
Valenta & E. Duran ed. 1987); THE CONTINUING CRISIS: U.S. POLICY IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
AND THE CARIBBEAN 4-5 (M. Falcoff & R. Royal ed. 1987); D. MCCULLOUGH, THE PATH 
BETWEEN THE SEAS 361-86 (1977). This tabulation includes the December 20, 1989 U.S. 
invasion of Panama. See N.Y. Times, Dec. 20, 1989, at AI, col. 1. 
2 Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1984 
I.C.]. 392 (Judgment of Nov. 26) [hereinafter Nicar. v. U.S. (Jurisdiction)]; 1986 I.C.]. 14 
(Judgment of June 17) [hereinafter Nicar. v. U.S. (Merits)]. 
3Id. at 20; see infra note 84 and accompanying text. 
4 See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4. 
5 Nicar. v. U.S. (Merits), 1986 I.C.]. at 19-20. 
6 See Nicar v. U.S. (Jurisdiction), 1984 I.C.]. at 396-97. 
7 See U.S. Dep't of State, Statement on the U.S. Withdrawal from the Proceedings 
Initiated by Nicaragua in the International Court of Justice (Jan. 18, 1985), reprinted in 24 
INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 246 (1985). 
8 Nicar. v. U.S. (Merits), 1986 I.C.]. at 134-35. 
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violated international law, the case has not proceeded to the dam-
ages phase. 
While the I.C.]. verdict in Nicaragua v. United States9 demon-
strated the lawlessness of U.S. Central American activities, the rec-
ognition of that lawlessness provides the United States with an 
opportunity to restructure its policy toward that region. In order 
to avoid an I.C.]. award of money damages to Nicaragua, the United 
States could instead frame a Central American policy premised on 
peaceful respect for the sovereignty of each state in the region. 
During the Winter of 1989-1990, the continued U.S. support for 
the besieged ruling regime in EI Salvador and the U.S. invasion of 
Panama have made the likelihood of such a Central American policy 
seem remote. On the other hand, the peaceful conclusion of the 
elections in Nicaragua and the election of the Chamorro govern-
ment make it possible that the United States might wish to adopt a 
Central American policy which respects the principles of interna-
tional law at all times, and not merely when it suits the United 
States. 
On November 4, 1988, a panel of distinguished scholars of 
international law met to discuss the possibility that the United States 
would take the opportunity presented by the Nicaragua case to 
renew its status as a proponent and exemplar of the principles of 
international law. In order of appearance, the panelists were: 
Professor Thomas Franck: Director of the Center for Interna-
tional Studies, New York University;!O 
Professor Anne-Marie Burley: Professor of Law, University of 
Chicago Law School;!! 
Professor Thomas Farer: Professor and Director of the Joint De-
gree Program in Law and International Relations, American Uni-
versity; !2 
Professor Jonathan Charney: Professor of Law, Vanderbilt Law 
School;!3 
91984 I.C.]. 392 (judgment of Nov. 26) (jurisdiction); 1986 I.C.]. 14 (judgment of 
June 17) (Merits). 
10 B.A., 1952; LL.M., 1953, British Columbia; LL.M, 1954; S.J.D., 1959, Harvard. Pro-
fessor Franck is the author of numerous books on international law and has been Editor-in-
Chief of the American Journal of International Law since 1984. 
II A.B., 1980, Princeton; M.Phil., 1982, Oxford; J.D., 1985, Harvard. At the time of the 
panel discussion, Professor Burley was a Harvard MacArthur Fellow in International Security. 
12 B.A., Princeton; LL.B., Harvard. Professor Farer is the former president of the Uni-
versity of New Mexico, past president of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights, 
and a member of the Board of Editors of the American Journal of International Law. 
13 B.A., 1965, New York University; J.D., 1968, University of Wisconsin. Professor Char-
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Professor Mark Janis: Professor of Law, University of Connecti-
cut Law School; 14 
Professor Jules Lobel: Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh 
Law School. 15 
The purpose of the discussion was to assess the implications of 
the decision in Nicaragua v. United States and to determine what 
courses of action were available to the United States in order that 
it might once again become a law-abiding nation in the international 
arena. Among the issues presented were 1) whether the U.S. should 
participate in the damages phase of the case; 2) what viable political 
alternatives to participation in the damages phase exist; and 3) what 
legal and political ramifications would follow from U.S. failure to 
participate in any damages proceedings. After the panelists pre-
sented their views on these issues, the floor was opened to questions 
and comments from the audience. What follows is a transcript of 
the panel discussion. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Thomas Franck, Moderator: Good afternoon. Our panel is going to 
discuss options for a law-abiding U.S. policy in Central America. 
Central to that theme is the notion that the United States is at a 
fork in the road in its Central American policy. Current develop-
ments presage important political and legal changes. An editorial 
printed in today's New York Times makes precisely that point. 16 
The editorial supports a viewpoint which I think will be made by 
our speakers today. There are new opportunities in international 
law which the U.S. government has not taken the full opportunity 
to explore. These possibilities have been created in two senses which 
are relevant to the lawyer. We know, of course, that there are 
significant new political developments in the Soviet Union, China 
and elsewhere. Recent proposals have advocated bilateral discus-
sions between U.S. legal advisor Abe Sofaer and Soviet Union legal 
advisor and Deputy Foreign Minister Igor Petrovsky aimed at an 
ney has been a consultant to the U.S. Department of State and is on the Board of Editors of 
the American Journal of International Law. 
14 A.B., 1969, Princeton; B.A. (jurisp.), 1972, Oxford; J.D., 1977, Harvard. Professor 
Janis is the author of several books and many articles on international law including An 
Introduction to International Law (1988). 
15 B.A., 1972, New York University; J.D .• 1978. Rutgers, Newark. Professor Lobel is a 
teacher of international and constitutional law. 
16In Sight: A Real World Court. N.Y. Times, Nov. 4, 1988, at A34, col. 1 [hereinafter A 
Real World Court]. 
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agreement by the U.S. and the Soviet Union to submit to the juris-
diction of the International Court in disputes arising out of multi-
lateral instruments to which both countries are partiesY 
In addition, there are a number of other promising initiatives 
in the international law field. The Soviet Union has accepted the 
notion of career service and competitive recruitment to positions in 
the United Nations. ls This implication would be revolutionary in-
deed, not solely because the Soviet Union has opposed that method 
of recruitment in the past, but also because there are many bureau-
cratic factors in the U.N. militating against merit appointments and 
merit promotions. 19 This change in the Soviet position is just one 
of several new developments of various kinds in the international 
organization field. 
We do not have here a representative or cross-sectional panel. 
Instead, the panel shares a set of assumptions which may not be 
widely shared by the International Law Association, the interna-
tional bar, or members of the academic and practicing communities. 
They share the assumption that all is not well with American policy 
toward Central America and that the United States is not currently 
a law-abiding citizen of the international community with respect 
to its Latin American policies. This raises two questions. First, if the 
U.S. is not law abiding, so what? Second, given our lawless position, 
where do we go from here? I have posed these and other questions 
in a letter I sent about a month ago to the members of the panel. 
The panelists will address these issues initially in brief statements 
and then respond to each other. Afterward, I have asked them to 
think collectively with you in the audience about what some of the 
possibilities might be for U.S. policy in Central America. I will not 
intervene again until all five of the panelists have had a brief say, 
unless the brief say becomes too long. With that, I will ask Anne-
Marie Burley to start. 
II. MULTINATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN THE CENTRAL AMERICAN 
PEACE PROCESS 
Anne-Marie Burley: Thank you. Before we can think about options 
for a law-abiding policy in Central America, we really have to ask 
17 See N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1988, at AI, col. 1 (Reagan administration proposes World 
Court arbitration of U.S.-Soviet disputes); id., Nov. 3, 1988, at All, col. 1 (Soviet Union 
indicates willingness to allow World Court adjudication of U.S.-Soviet disputes). 
18 See N. Y. Times, June 4, 1988, at AI, col. 2 (Soviet Union supports career appointment 
of U.N. employees). 
19Id. 
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what political objectives we want to achieve. Then, perhaps, we can 
try to figure out law-abiding means of achieving those goals. Three 
issues come to mind that will shape our objectives. First is the 
internal situation in Nicaragua, particularly with regard to civil and 
politicalliberties. 20 Second is whether Nicaragua is a security prob-
lem or a threat to the other states in the region. These two issues 
are all too often confused in the domestic debate, yet are quite 
distinct. Third is the case brought by Nicaragua in the World 
Court.21 What we do about that case will certainly have an impact 
on our relations with Nicaragua. More importantly, it raises larger 
questions about our attitude toward the Court and toward inter-
national law in general. I would like to focus on each one of these 
issues for a few minutes. 
First of all, with respect to the internal political situation in 
Nicaragua, the U.S. wants to bring about change, either by pres-
suring the government through destabilizing activity or by forcing 
a change in the political system.22 The applicable principles of in-
ternationallaw, however, prohibit intervention in the internal affairs 
of a foreign nation,23 leaving no legal options for unilateral action. 
So I think that question answers itself, at least for the moment. We 
can certainly either choose not to do business with Nicaragua, or 
conversely, grant aid conditioned on political change. 24 But in terms 
20 A 1981 investigation of Nicaragua found greater respect for human rights under the 
Sandinistas than had existed under the Somoza regime. See generally INTER-AMERICAN COM-
MISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON THE SITUATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE REPUBLIC 
OF NICARAGUA (1981) [hereinafter REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN NICARAGUA]' By 1986, 
however, actions taken by both the Contras and the Sandinistas seriously threatened human 
rights in Nicaragua. AMERICAS WATCH COMMITTEE, HUMAN RIGHTS IN NICARAGUA 1985-
1986, 1-13 (1986); see also Farer, Looking at Looking at Nicaragua: The Problematique of Impar-
tiality in Human Rights Inquiries, 10 HUM. RTS. Q. 141 (1988). In part, the Reagan Adminis-
tration justified its intervention in Nicaragua as an answer to human rights violations com-
mitted by the Sandinistas against the Miskito Indians, including the 1982 relocation of 8,500 
Miskitos out of areas in which the Sandinistas and the Contras were fighting. See H. SKLAR, 
WASHINGTON'S WAR ON NICARAGUA 103-04 (1988). 
21 Nicar. v. U.S. (Merits), 1986 I.C.]. 14. 
22 See Note, Lawless Interoention: United States Foreign Policy in El Salvador and Nicaragua, 
7 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 223, 241 (1987) [hereinafter Lawless Interoention] (the aim of U.S. 
support of the Contras was to "force the Nicaraguan government to 'say Uncle.'" (quoting 
R. Reagan, President's News Conference of Feb. 21, 1985, 21 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Doc. 213 
(Feb. 21,1985))). 
23 See U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4 ("All members shall refrain in their international 
relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political indepen-
dence of any state .... "). 
24 See infra note 34 and accompanying text (discussing non-military influence over inter-
nal affairs of other states). 
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of active unilateral policy designed to achieve another objective, 
there is no legal option. 
The next issue is the security problem. There are two prongs 
to this issue. First, to what extent is Nicaragua exporting revolu-
tion?25 Second, how do we stop it? There again, once you break it 
down, the answer is not very complicated. There have been a num-
ber of proposals for multilateral forces, either under UN or OAS 
auspices, to monitor the borders and reduce the security threat.26 
Most recently Honduras has called for such a force, not to check 
on arms shipments to the Sandinistas, but to monitor the Contras.2' 
An effective monitoring system would address both aspects of the 
security problem, as the Arias Plan has recognized.28 A better model 
is actually the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe 
(CSCE).29 The Conference has recognized a connection between 
domestic affairs and external security such that internal instability 
affects not only the security of the country in which it arises but 
also the stability of that country's neighbors. gO It is also an ongoing 
process in which countries have a legitimate right to intervene in 
some measure or at least to be concerned with domestic political 
systems of their neighbors for security reasons. It seems to me the 
CSCE may be a model for addressing both problems I raise by 
essentially institutionalizing something like the Arias Plan, provid-
ing not a response to a crisis, but an ongoing regional process. 
The third issue, as I said, is the Nicaragua case. What has most 
damaged the United States is not that the Court has held us in 
2. The Court found some evidence of Nicaragua "exporting revolution." See Nicar. v. 
U.S. (Merits), 1986 I.C.J. at 82 ("support for the armed opposition in El Salvador from 
Nicaraguan territory was a fact up to the early months of 1981 .... "); see also id. at 87 
("certain transborder military incursions into Honduras and Costa Rica are imputable to the 
Government of Nicaragua."). 
26 For example, in August of 1987, the leaders of Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, 
Honduras and Nicaragua met under the direction of Costa Rican President Oscar Arias and 
proposed an international commission to oversee termination of military and guerilla activities 
in Central America. See Agreements by the Presidents of Central America (the Guatemala 
Peace Plan), Aug. 7, 1987, at § 10, reprinted in Comment, The Political Influences on Effective 
Treatymaking in America's Backyard: The Guatemala Peace Plan-A Case Study, 7 DICK. J. INT'L 
L. 95, 126 (1988). 
27 See N.Y. Times, Oct. 5, 1988, at AS, col. 1 (Honduras calls for U.N. peacekeeping 
force to monitor influx of Contras and Salvadoran rebels into the country). 
28 See supra note 26. 
29 See Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, Final Act, Aug. 1, 1975, 
reprinted in 14 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 1292 [hereinafter Helsinki Final Act]. 
so See id. at ch. 1, art. VII (stating that "[t]he participating states recognize the universal 
significance of human rights and fundamental freedoms, respect for which is an essential 
factor for the peace, justice and well-being necessary to ensure the development of friendly 
relations and co-operation among themselves as among all states."). 
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violation of international law. While that is serious, even more se-
rious is the United States' hypocritical reaction to the case, flouting 
a respected international body in a process we have supported for 
decades.31 We ought, instead, to do something that will strengthen 
the Court. The most obvious option is to rejoin the proceedings 
and accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court. But on a 
deeper level, I think we need to do something that will allow the 
present judgment to have some effect. One of the worst things that 
could happen for the Court is to have another Corfu Channel-type 
case32 in which the Court assesses damages against the U.S. that are 
never paid,33 thus providing one more example to be cited by people 
who want to say that international law makes no difference. This 
result can be avoided. The damages phase of the Nicaragua case 
has not yet occurred. There is a window of opportunity to enter 
into settlement negotiations with Nicaragua. Such an action would, 
in some way, take account of the judgment as part of a political 
settlement, which could implicitly allow the Court to have some 
impact on the evolution of political events. I think this would do a 
great deal for the Court and would honor our obligations at inter-
national law. 
III. LEGAL PRINCIPLES, IDEOLOGY AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
Thomas Farer: In deciding what we should do in Central America 
we need first to consider what criteria ought to be employed. It 
would seem to me that there are three perspectives that most people 
use, consciously or unconsciously, in thinking about what American 
policy should be. One is legal. The whole question of what inter-
national law tolerates, allows or encourages in connection with for-
eign involvement in essentially domestic disputes was rehearsed to 
the point of repletion during the Vietnamese conflict. Over the past 
31 See generally D. F. FLEMING, THE UNITED STATES AND THE WORLD COURT (1968) (noting 
the leading role of the U.S. in establishing the Permanent International Court of Justice and 
the International Court of Justice and U.S. support for the international rule of law). 
32 The Corfu Channel Case (U.K. v. Alb.), 1949I.C.J. 4 (Judgment of Apr. 9) [hereinafter 
The Corfu Channel Case] (suit by the United Kingdom against Albania for the cost of two 
naval vessels destroyed by mines laid in the Corfu Channel). 
33 ld. at 249 (damages awarded to the United Kingdom by the Court); see C. GRAY, 
JUDICIAL REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 82-87 (1987) (noting that an award of money 
damages is unusual in international law). 
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eight years, it has been rehearsed once again,34 to the point that I 
begin to weep for the trees that have been cut down to produce the 
paper on which these observations continue to be recorded. My 
recommendation is to avoid discussing that issue and to found a 
society on behalf of the trees comparable to the Save the Whales 
societies. 
Moving to strategic issues, the principle concern has been that 
the virus of revolution will be exported to other Central American 
states from a consolidated Marxist regime in Managua.35 Those of 
you who have a northern New England provenance like myself may 
recall that, for a century prior to 1936, there was a saying in the 
country that "as Maine goes, so goes the nation." It was supposed 
to be the bellwether electoral state. In the 1936 election where 
F.D.R. captured forty-six of forty-eight states, the saying was 
changed to "as Maine goes, so goes Vermont." I feel the same way 
about Nicaragua. 
Though it seems to me unlikely, I am willing to concede the 
possibility that the consolidation of the Sandinista regime might 
have some influence on what happens in EI Salvador. But I am 
unconvinced, as I have always been unconvinced, that what happens 
to EI Salvador matters a great deal to the world strategic balance. 
Next there is the ideological perspective or the human rights 
perspective, as some might call it. For the Reagan administration, 
and for many people unassociated with it, it has been the question 
of democracy. There is, in fact, one democratic state in Central 
America. Although this is not widely known, it is the long lost twin 
of Uruguay, kidnapped 200 years ago from its home in the southern 
cone of South America and dumped into the middle of the Central 
American isthmus. I refer, of course, to Costa Rica. There is no 
other democratic state in Central America. 
For over two millennia, there has been considerable debate as 
to what democracy means; how it is properly defined. As Samuel 
Huntington pointed out in a paper delivered a couple years ago, 
34 See, e.g., Damrosch, Politics Across Borders: Nonintervention and Nonforcible Influence Over 
Domestic Affairs, 83 AM. J. INT'L L. 1 (1989) [hereinafter Damrosch, Politics]; see also T. NARDIN, 
LAw, MORTALITY, AND THE RELATIONS OF STATES (1983); INTERVENTION IN WORLD POLITICS 
(H. Bull ed. 1984); F. TESON, HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: AN INQUIRY INTO LAW AND 
MORALITY (1988); Reisman, Coercion and Self-Determination: Construing Charter Article 2(4),78 
AM. J. INT'L L. 642 (1984) (cited in Damrosch, Politics at 27 n.42). 
35 See supra note 25; see also J. KIRKPATRICK, DICTATORSHIPS AND DOUBLE STANDARDS 53-
90 (1982) (asserting that Central American states are vulnerable to Marxist revolution ex-
ported from neighboring states). 
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Schumpeter has won.36 There is today almost universal agreement 
that democracy is a political arrangement under which the power 
to decide, as Schum peter puts it, is allocated on the basis of electoral 
contestation.37 If one accepts that definition of democracy, Guate-
mala, EI Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua are not democracies. 
Guatemala, EI Salvador and Honduras have elections, but the power 
to decide the most important political, military and social questions 
remains in the barracks of the armed forces. 38 Arguably, the cases 
of Honduras and EI Salvador are more complicated. Power in those 
two countries arguably is divided between the barracks of the armed 
forces and the American Embassy.39 
In Nicaragua, the 1984 election consolidated the power 
achieved previous to the election by other means. The traditions 
and the existing social and political structures in Nicaragua make 
it, I think, inevitable that, for the time being, decisive power in that 
society will be in the hands of one small group or another. The only 
question is: which small group? I do not believe authentic full scale 
democracy can be achieved at the present time because there are 
no powerful neutral institutions within the society that can guar-
antee the indefinite continuance of fair electoral contestation. All 
social actors face the grave danger of one person, one vote, once. 
What I think can be negotiated, and indeed was virtually ne-
gotiated within the last two years, is space in which institutions 
ultimately capable of supporting a democratic system could evolve. 
A Sandinista-dominated political order enjoying normal relations 
with the United States is more likely to evolve toward political 
pluralism and a relatively humane society than one dominated by 
General Bermudez, former colonel of the National Guard.40 You 
may feel that my own political biases, not known but at least sus-
pected by many of you, make me an incredible evaluator of General 
Bermudez. But, if you wish to read the 1979 report of the Inter-
36 See Huntington, Will Countries Become More Democratic?, 99 POL. SCI. Q. 193 (1985). 
37Id. 
38 See, e.g., 2 M. MCCLINTOCK, THE AMERICAN CONNECTION 215-234 (1985) (military in 
Guatemala has absolute control of the government). 
39 See AMERICAS WATCH COMMITTEE, THE CIVILIAN TOLL 1986-1987, 295 (1987) (the 
U.S. provided $268 million to EI Salvador in 1986); Note, Lawless Intervention, supra note 22, 
at 227 (U.S. aid to EI Salvador between 1981 and 1986 exceeded $2 billion). 
40 Col. Enrique Bermudez was Nicaragua's military attache assigned to Washington at 
the time the Somoza government fell and had been the commander of Somoza's National 
Guard. He was instrumental in forming the first Contra units out of former National Guard 
units and became de facto commander of the Contras. See H. SKLAR, supra note 20, at 77. 
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American Human Rights Commission,41 a Commission consisting 
largely of extremely conservative men and women, you will find it 
extraordinarily difficult to believe a that a former National Guard 
colonel would reign over a democratic system in Nicaragua. 
I do not suggest that the Sandinistas have a democratic voca-
tion. The principle reason I think that the Sandinistas are more 
likely to be the patrons of a process which could culminate over a 
period of time in recognizable, democratic institutions is that they 
are subject to important constraints by virtue of living within our 
sphere of influence. I fear on the basis of our experience with 
Central America that a regime of the right would not feel such 
constraints.42 I will be happy to elaborate on any of these points 
later on, but I want to yield the floor now. 
IV. THE ROLE OF THE I.C.]. IN Nicaragua v. United States 
jonathan Charney: My presentation will focus primarily on the Nic-
aragua case and the role of the International Court of Justice 
(I.C.].). Much of what I have to say has already been mentioned, 
but let me put it in my own words. The United States traditionally 
has been committed to the rule of public international law43 for 
very good reasons. The rule of international law overwhelmingly 
serves the interests of the United States.44 International adjudication 
promotes effective international law, specifically in the cases that 
are brought to the Court. More generally, it promotes adherence 
to the rule of law since states appreciate that their actions may be 
subject to litigation before the Court. Until recently, the U.S. had 
accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the I.C.J. It still remains a 
party to many international agreements which contain com prom-
issory clauses by which the United States has consented to be sued 
in the Court if disputes arise with regard to the application or 
interpretation of these agreements.45 The U.S. commitment to the 
41 REPORT ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN NICARAGUA, supra note 20. 
42 See AMERICAS WATCH, supra note 39, at 295 (describing u.s. support for the ruling 
regime in El Salvador and U.S. acquiescence in human rights violations). 
43 See L. Henkin, How Nations Behave 53, 62-63 (1970). See also Franck and Lehrman, 
Messianism and Chauvinism in America's Commitment to Peace Through Law, in THE INTERNA-
TIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS (L. Damrosch ed. 1987) at 3. 
44 See generally Henkin, supra note 43. 
45 See, e.g., Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, Jan. 21, 1956, United States 
- Nicaragua, art. 24, para. 2, 9 U.S.T. 449, 467, T.I.A.S. No. 4024 (com promissory clause 
made the U.S. subject to World Court jurisdiction). See Charney, Compromissory Clauses and 
the jurisdiction of the International Court of justice, 81 AM J. INT'L, L. 855 (1987); Morrison, 
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I.C.]. traditionally has been strong, despite the likelihood that not 
every case to which it may be a party will be decided in its favor. 
In the Nicaragua case, the Court found that it had jurisdiction 
based on both a compromissory clause and compulsory jurisdic-
tion.46 I believe that as a result the United States is legally bound to 
abide by the judgment on the merits in the case. It is also effectively 
bound by that judgment. International pressure has been put on 
the United States to abide by itY There has also been domestic 
pressure to abide by the judgment particularly from the U.S. Con-
gress.48 
In that context, let us turn to the damages phase of the case, 
which is about to be reached. I believe that if the Court were to 
adjudge the United States liable for damages, its liability would have 
serious diplomatic and political ramifications for the United States. 
A substantial judgment against the U.S. will increase the damage 
suffered by the United States. It is in the U.S. interest to promote 
the rule of international law. If an unpaid judgment were to hang 
over the United States, its international prestige and its ability to 
promote behavior consistent with international law would be further 
damaged. 
What should the United States do about this? As a party to the 
action, the United States is not legally obligated to participate in the 
litigation.49 It chose not to do so at the merits phase, although it 
did participate at the jurisdiction phase.50 Even so, the U.S. is en-
titled to participate at the damages phase. It certainly could come 
in and present its position at that time. If one were to examine the 
results of the merits phase, it would become apparent that the 
Treaties as a Source of jurisdiction, Especially in U.S. Practices, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF 
JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS (L. Damrosch ed. 1987) at 58; Sohn, Settlement of Disputes Relating 
to the Interpretation and Application of Treaties, 150 RECUEIL DES COURS 195 (1976); Senate 
Comm. on Foreign Relations, International Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the 
Crime of Genocide, S. Exec. Rep. No. 50, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 37-81 (1984). 
46 Nicar. v. U.S. (Merits), 1986 I.C.]. at 17 (citing STATUTE OF THE I.C.]., art. 36 (1945) 
(stating which cases are under the compulsory jurisdiction of the World Court)); see also 
Treaty of Friendship, supra note 45; see Charney, Compromissory Clauses, supra note 45. 
47 See N.Y. Times, Aug. I, 1986, at A3, col. I (eleven countries in the U.N. Security 
Council voted to compel U.S. compliance with the I.C.]. ruling; the U.S. vetoed the resolution. 
48 See, e.g., N.Y. Times, july I, 1986, at A22, col I (editorial calling for U.S. compliance 
with I.C.]. ruling in the Nicaragua case). 
49 See Charney, Disputes Implicating the Institutional Credibility of the Court: Problems of Non-
Appearance, Non-Participation, and Non-Performance, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 
AT CROSSROADS (L. Damrosch ed. 1987) at 288, 290. 
50 Nicar. v. U.S. (Merits), 1986 I.C.]. at 17. See Charney, Disputes Implicating the Institutional 
Credibility of the Court, supra note 49. 
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United States' failure to participate worked against its interests. For 
example, the Court was not presented with all the factual and legal 
arguments that it might have considered.51 Had the United States 
been before the Court as an actual participant this might not have 
happened. At the damages phase, there are opportunities for the 
U.S. to defend successfully its own interests, if it chooses to partic-
ipate. I do not want, however, to exaggerate these opportunities. 
I believe that it is open to the U.S. to argue for either mitigation 
of damages or a reversal on some of the matters that were addressed 
at the merits phase. For example, the Court did not have adequate 
information on the alleged illegal activities of Nicaragua. If pre-
sented with such evidence, the Court might either directly or indi-
rectly reverse its position. The South-West Africa cases stand as a 
good example of this possibility. 52 There is a prudential reason for 
the United States to present its case. If the United States were to 
appear before the Court and thereby exhibit a willingness to par-
ticipate, the Court may be more inclined to take into account U.S. 
interests and arguments not previously addressed. 
With respect to settlement, the U.S. and Nicaragua could settle 
the case at any time, on any terms, even after damages have been 
awarded. For example, in the Iran/U.S. Hostages case53 the Court 
decided that the U.S. was entitled to an award of damages. 54 Dam-
ages were not assessed, however, because the Hostages Acc1rd ren-
dered the case moot without a confession of error by either side, 
and without the payment of damages.55 In the instant case, it is 
possible that the U.S. and Nicaragua could resolve this difficult 
situation through bilateral, multilateral or even global negotiations. 
51 See Nicar. v. U.S. (Merits), 1986 I.C.]. at 22-26 (discussing the disadvantage faced by 
the U.S. as a result of its failure to appear in the case). See Highet, Evidence, the Court and the 
Nicaragua Case, 81 AM. ]. INT'L L. 1 (1987); Charney, Disputes Implicating the Institutional 
Credibility of the Court, supra note 49, at 290-91; Charney, Customary International Law in the 
Nicaragua Case judgment on the Merits, 1 HAGUE Y.B. INT'L L. 16,25 (1988). 
52 Compare South West Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr. and Lib. v. S. Afr.), 1962 I.C.]. 319, 
343 (Judgment of Dec. 21) (non-parties to League of Nations mandate for South West Africa 
have standing to sue in the World Court for violations of the mandate) with South West 
Africa Cases (Eth. v. S. Afr. and Lib. v. S. Afr.), 1966 I.C.]. 4, 37-38, 47 (Judgment of July 
18) (such non-parties to the mandate do not have a cause of action under international law). 
See Charney, Compromissory Clauses and the jurisdiction of the International Court of justice, supra 
note 45, at 876-77. 
53 U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (U.S. v. Iran), 1980 I.C.]. 3 (Judgment 
of May 24) [hereinafter U.S. v. Iran]. 
5<Id. at 45. 
55 Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria 
[the Algeria "Iran Hostages" Accords], Feb. 1981, reprinted in 75 AM.]. INT'L L. 418 (1981). 
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This would prevent the United States from placing itself in a posi-
tion whereby it violates a judgment on the merits. It would also 
preclude the issuance of a specific damages award in favor of Nic-
aragua. 
v. THE HISTORICAL SUPPORT FOR THE I.C.j. IN 
THE UNITED STATES 
Mark Janis: In his letter to us, Professor Franck posed a set of 
questions which he summarized as "so what" and "then what." For 
my contribution to "so what" let me say a little about how the 
Nicaragua case fits into the history of the I.C.]. For my "then what" 
let me talk about a way to solve the problem of U.S. compliance 
with the I.C.j. decision. 
Turning first to "so what" and the history of the Court, let me 
commend to you the book Lori Damrosch has edited, The Interna-
tional Court of Justice at a Crossroads. 56 Many of you here were con-
tributors. One lesson from the book is that we Americans tend to 
generalize our own experiences about the Court into assumptions 
of universal experiences. 57 We may be a bit presumptuous about 
this. Another lesson is that although the number of Court cases is 
few, 58 at least annually, the commentary about them is legion. This 
is, I think, because of the symbolism of the Court. The debate about 
the I.C.]. is an important reflection of larger ideas about the role 
of the United States in world politics and indeed about preferences 
about world order. 
With respect to our own American perceptions of international 
law, at least as early as the War of 1812, when New England suffered 
so much by the War, there has been enthusiasm here for an inter-
national court, the idea being to replace wars with adjudications of 
international disputes. Soon after that war concluded in 1815, David 
Low Dodge and Noah Worcester founded the first two peace soci-
eties in America in New York and Massachusetts. Both were dedi-
cated to the twin goals of promotion of international law and the 
establishment of some form of international court. 
As Professor Franck has written, America has exhibited two 
personalities regarding international law since the founding of these 
56 THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS (L. Damrosch ed. 1987). 
57 See iti. at xxi. 
58 In the 40 years spanning 1947-1986 the World Court heard a total of 73 cases, of 
which 55 were active disputes (or "contentious cases") and 18 were advisory opinions. See 
I.C.J.Y.B. 3 (1985-1986). 
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early international law societies. 59 America has been very idealistic 
about international law, but also has a tradition of repudiating 
international law.60 In any case it is true that the promotion of 
international law and international courts is one part of the Amer-
ican tradition, and that this tradition originated in those early peace 
societies. When I read this morning's New York Times editorial 
supporting the World Court,61 it was important, not so much be-
cause the Nicaragua case itself is all that important or the Court 
itself is even that important, but because the editorial symbolized a 
long-standing American ideal about the potential role of interna-
tional law. What we talk about today is not only the Nicaragua case 
but the role of the International Court and even more generally 
about the role of international law and adjudication in world poli-
tics. This is a very old debate in these parts. 
Let me now briefly address the question of what we should do 
now, the "then what" question. As I contemplated this meeting, I 
searched for a solution that is good for both international law and 
for the U.S. I therefore would like to put before you a modest 
proposal which I am totally unable to defend but would be glad to 
discuss later. It struck me that one precedent of international law 
we might think of following is the precedent of setting up an inter-
national arbitral tribunal to decide how to implement the judgment 
on the merits in the Nicaragua case.62 I envision a panel composed 
of perhaps three arbitrators, one appointed by the U.S., another 
appointed by Nicaragua and a third appointed independently. The 
U.S. and Nicaragua would then sign a treaty entrusting the imple-
mentation of the I.C.]. judgment to the panel. While this panel 
would obviously directly affect the Nicaragua case, its advantages 
would be even greater. This plan would show that America does 
not repudiate the decision of the Court. We would then recognize 
that the Court's decision has some validity, although many Ameri-
cans differ with the substance of its findings. Furthermore, submis-
sion of the dispute to arbitration takes the damages phase out of 
the World Court. At this point in the case, the Court has become 
59 See Franck & Lehrman, Messianism and Chauvinism in America's Commitment to Peace 
Through Law, in THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS, supra note 56, at 
3-18. 
6°Id. 
61 See supra note 16. 
62 See c. GRAY, supra note 33, at 5-58 (discussing international arbitral practice and 
procedure); see also notes 155 and 156 infra (discussing the history of international arbitra-
tion). 
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so politicized, both by the United States and by others, that it is 
very difficult for the Court to act impartially.63 I think it might be 
easier for an arbitral panel to successfully reconcile the differences 
between the United States and Nicaragua over the substance of this 
dispute. It might also be one more small step towards effective 
international law and binding adjudication of international disputes. 
VI. LIVING WITH LEFTIST REGIMES IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
Jules Lobel: In order to determine what options exist for a law-
abiding U.S. policy in Central America, it is necessary to ask a basic 
question. Is the United States government willing to permit the 
maintenance of a leftist Marxist government in Nicaragua that does 
not militarily export its revolution or its ideology, but does give 
political, economic, cultural and ideological support to leftist groups 
in other countries? Looking at post-war United States history, nei-
ther major party nor any administration, with the possible exception 
of the post-Watergate, post-Vietnam years of the Carter adminis-
tration, has been willing to answer that question affirmatively.64 
Since World War II, we have seen continuous and repeated efforts 
by both Democratic and Republican administrations to overthrow 
leftist Marxist governments.65 These efforts have focused on both 
democratically elected governments in Guatemala and Chile and on 
revolutionary governments in Nicaragua and Cuba. Past debate 
over options for a law-abiding policy, thus constrained, centered 
around tactics for removal of this perceived unwanted cancer from 
our hemisphere. Some, like the Reagan administration, have urged 
military intervention, directly deploying U.S. forces, as in Gran-
ada,66 or by provision of military aid to surrogate anti-leftist forces.67 
Those opposed to military intervention advocate a variety of polit-
ical and economic pressures designed to topple leftist governments, 
63 But see Weiss, Judicio,l Independence and Impartio,lity: A Preliminary Inquiry, in THE INTER-
NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE AT A CROSSROADS, supra note 56, at 128-33 (suggesting that 
judges on the I.C.]. do not tend to vote in a predetermined fashion). 
64 See generally.J. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 35, at 53-90 (describing relation of Central 
America to the security of the U.S.). 
65 See, e.g., L. D. BENDER, THE POLITICS OF HOSTILITY 20-31 (1975) (describing the 
Eisenhower-Kennedy intervention in Cuba at the Bay of Pigs); see generally.J. PETRAS & M. 
MORLEY, THE UNITED STATES AND CHILE (1975) (analysis of the Nixon Administration's 
covert operation against Allende in Chile). 
66 See generally Joyner, The United States Action in Grenada: Reflections on the Lawfulness of 
Invasion, 78 AM . .J. INT'L L. 172 (1984); 
67 See Note, Lawless Intervention, supra note 22, at 240-42 (U.S. establishment and support 
of the Contras in order to destabilize the government). 
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such as trade embargoes,68 forbidding loans to leftist governments69 
and covertly or overtly aiding opposition forces within the govern-
ment, either prior to or during the elections. 70 Unfortunately, both 
sides of the debate are interventionist. While there certainly exists 
a wide gulf between the two options and certainly both have seri-
ously different consequences, both fail to respect the basic principles 
of sovereignty contained in internationallaw.71 Consequently, both 
approaches fundamentally violate the spirit of a truly law-abiding 
U.S. policy towards the region. 
It therefore seems to me that the question is one of political 
will. Are we willing to live with Marxist governments like the San-
dinista government and recognize that revolution in many of these 
countries is virtually inevitable? In countries such as EI Salvador 
and Guatemala, the United States has opposed revolutionary move-
ments for the last fifty years. Thus far, we have forestalled revolu-
tion, but at the tremendous cost of thousands of lives.72 We could 
probably continue to forestall these revolutions for years, possibly 
decades longer, but in the long term of history, it seems to me that 
fewer countries will successfully avoid revolution. 
In that context, I would suggest that the options for a law-
abiding policy center around several basic goals. First, with respect 
to Nicaragua, I think we should resume economic aid, resume 
normal relations, resume humanitarian aid and end the economic 
embargo. The way to do this would be in the context of a settlement. 
My hunch is that the Sandinistas would willingly settle the World 
Court case if we were really willing to resume neutral aid to the 
people and government of Nicaragua and to suspend aid designed 
68 See generally G. HUFFBAUER & J. SCHOTT, ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN SUPPORT OF FOREIGN 
POLICY GOALS (1983) (analysis of the effectiveness of economic alternatives to armed inter-
vention); see also Damrosch, supra note 34, at 31. 
69 See G. HUFFBAUER & J. SCHOTT, supra note 68. 
70 See Damrosch, Politics, supra note 34, at 14 (noting U.S. support for anti-communist 
parties in elections in France and Italy in the late 1940s and its activities opposing the Allende 
party in elections in Chile in the 1960s and 1970s). Professor Damrosch states that countries 
such as the U.S. now openly support pro-democratic parties in elections in other countries, 
a practice now widely accepted in the international community as constructively promoting 
democracy. She further notes, however, that such intervention is still prone to abuse. See id. 
at 18-20. 
71 See, e.g., U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4, supra note 23 (member states are not to 
intervene in the sovereign affairs of other states). 
72 See generally AMERICAS WATCH, supra note 39 (EI Salvador); M. MCCLINTOCK, supra 
note 38 (Guatemala) (detailing the cost in lives and dollars of U.S. support for rightist regimes 
in EI Salvador and Guatemala against domestic insurgencies). 
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to undermine the Sandinista government. Such an agreement could 
easily substitute for damages in that case. 
Second, the Arias Plan and the other various plans that have 
been developed all include some multilateral peacekeeping force 
and possible demilitarization of the region.73 At least with respect 
to the peacekeeping forces, the Sandinistas would accept such a 
plan and have openly expressed their willingness to do SO.74 I think 
that demilitarization of the region on a wide scale would also be 
accepted. Here again it would be our government that would likely 
reject both plans because of the risk that these plans would allow 
successful completion of Marxist revolutions in countries such as El 
Salvador and Guatemala. In the unlikely event that the United 
States would accept change in El Salvador and Guatemala, I think 
it could also normalize relations with Cuba. 
Another factor bearing on Central American policy is the ques-
tion of democracy. Here I would somewhat differ with Professor 
Farer. I do not think the United States should see its role as pres-
suring Nicaragua toward greater democratization. I doubt whether 
our government has ever really been concerned about democracy 
in countries such as Nicaragua, El Salvador or Guatemala. Nor do 
I believe that our pressure, given our historical role of intervening 
against the popular will in these countries, will be successful. We 
should instead recognize that in Marxist governments all over the 
world there are winds of change occurring.75 Nicaragua's current 
reforms are seen by many revolutionary movements not as an at-
tempt to create a liberal democracy but as an attempt to create space 
for an opposition. How long that space will continue and how large 
it will grow is something that is yet to be determined. Nonetheless, 
we must recognize that openness has not resulted simply from our 
pressure but is a symptom of underlying change occurring through-
out the socialist world. 
Finally, with respect to the World Court, we should try to settle 
this case before the Court issues a final damages verdict because I 
think that would only turn out badly. A settlement is possible. There 
73 See Guatemala Peace Plan, supra note 26, at §§ 2 (cessation of hostilities) and 5 (cessation 
of support for insurgencies in neighboring countries). 
74 See id. (Nicaragua joined other Central American countries in approving the Guatemala 
Peace Plan). 
75 A key example of change in the Marxist world has been the Soviet Union, whose 
internal restructuring has allowed other socialist states to undertake democratic reform. See 
N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1988, at AI, col. 4 (discussing the extent of restructuring in the Soviet 
Union). 
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are, however, two political concerns about the World Court that are 
more important than settlement of the Nicaragua case. First, how 
do we respond to the new winds coming from the Soviet Union 
favoring a multilateral approach to the World Court?76 Second, how 
should we resolve the problem of adjudicating uses of force? With 
respect to the second question, Professor Franck has written an 
excellent book on the historical role of the United States in the 
World Court77 which, unfortunately, comes to the conclusion that 
we cannot expect the Court to resolve questions of the use of force. 78 
In terms of our own domestic course, we have seen over the last 
twenty years the use of the political question doctrine to avoid 
resolution of these questions in U.S. courts.79 Nevertheless, we of 
the International Law Society and the international community can-
not give up on this hope, which we have to understand is at the 
present time merely a hope, that issues of use of force can eventually 
be adjudicated and not left simply to unilateral political determi-
nation. 
VII. LEGAL OPTIONS FOR KEEPING THE PEACE 
IN CENTRAL AMERICA 
A. Collective Security 
Thomas Franck: As I had hoped, the panel has laid out a range of 
fascinating options for U.S. international policy. I am going to go 
back to the first proposed option and ask each of them to react to 
a scenario. Let me start with Anne-Marie Burley'S notion of a 
"streetwise" version of the Helsinki Accord. We have learned much 
since the Helsinki Accord was signed about the limits of U.S. power, 
even in this hemisphere. Just as we have learned the limits of our 
global power in Vietnam, we have learned through the Contra 
experience about the limits of our power in Central America. These 
limits constrain any policy designed to make this hemisphere com-
patible with the economic and socio-political agenda of the United 
76 See supra notes 17-19 and accompanying text. 
77 T. Franck, JUDGING THE WORLD COURT (1986). 
78 See id. at 63-76. 
79 See, e.g., Goldwater v. Carter, 444 V.S. 996,1002-06 (1979) (Rehnquist,J., concurring) 
(four judges would dismiss suit to bar abrogation of treaty of defense between the V.S. and 
Taiwan because the case involved a political question beyond the jurisdiction of the Court); 
see also Crockett v. Reagan, 558 F. Supp. 893 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd 720 F.2d 1355 (D.C. Cir. 
1983) (suit challenging V.S. aid to EI Salvador dismissed since issue raised in suit constituted 
a non-justiciable political question). 
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States. Such an agenda presumably would have to be pursued 
through non-military means. Everybody on the panel has agreed 
on that. 
The Helsinki model as a non-military policy option, offers an 
interesting paradox.so On the one hand, non-intervention is so 
firmly established as a rule of international law that it is not worth 
pulping a single twig, to build on Professor Farer's simile, to suggest 
otherwise. On the other hand, we do not know what non-interven-
tion means. The Helsinki model is a form of intervention. Professor 
Lori Damrosch at Columbia has written an article for the American 
Journal of International LawS! which argues that a fair amount of 
political intervention has become normatively accepted in the inter-
national community.s2 I noticed that even Jules Lobel, in defining 
how the Sandinistas are likely to operate if they are left alone, said 
almost parenthetically that they will continue to support like-
minded ideologies. I think, therefore, the Helsinki model inter-
preted today, assumes that there is in the international system a 
considerable amount of tolerance for supporting tendencies in 
nearby countries or in countries in which one is interested. 
Assume, for the purpose of discussion, we are sitting in the 
State Department. We have determined we cannot use military force 
as a tool of our Western Hemisphere policy. On the other hand, 
there are certainly events in Central America which, if ignored, 
would make life uncomfortable for us in the United States and 
Canada. Our task is then to try to pursue a Helsinki-like approach, 
and at the same time get rid of this damages judgment that has 
been awarded against us by the World Court. Let us agree, with the 
Central American countries or perhaps with the Contadora nations 
as guarantors, to establish a Helsinki-like Central American Com-
mission. It would be funded by the billion dollar judgment which 
the Court has awarded against the United States and which, with 
the agreement of Nicaragua, will be passed to this commission. The 
job of the Central American Commission, unlike the Helsinki Com-
mission, will not simply entail meeting every two years to shoot the 
breeze and look at some reports. It would instead actively intervene 
in the region to insure achievement of economic, political and social 
80 See generally Helsinki Final Act, supra note 29 (recognizing a norm of non-intervention 
in internal affairs of other states while providing for monitoring of human rights violations 
in other states). 
81 Damrosch, Politics, supra note 34. 
82 [d. at 5-6. 
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goals. It would guarantee a free press, protect against military in-
tervention across boundaries and strive to insure that the govern-
ments of Central America explicitly advance stated economic de-
velopment goals which partake of the nature of economic human 
rights. Is this concept reasonable or unreasonable, lawful or unlaw-
ful, in the interest of the United States or not in the interest of the 
United States? 
Anne-Marie Burley: I guess I like the Helsinki idea. I do have a 
slightly different notion of the Helsinki process. It is true that there 
is a good deal of informal intervention in the affairs of other coun-
tries, but I think the premise of the Helsinki process is acceptance 
of the fundamental legitimacy of all participants in the international 
arena.83 This really goes to some of the questions raised by Mark 
Janis and Jules Lobel about whether we are really prepared to 
accept the political orientation of other countries and then not to 
intervene. Second, I would ask what you mean by a commission 
intervening without force. 
Thomas Franck: Money could be used to buy a printing press, for 
example, if the printing presses had been closed by the government. 
You should also refuse to provide any funding to governments that 
were in flagrant violation of economic development rights. Fur-
thermore, the billion dollars would just be the first installment. 
Anne-Marie Burley: I am not sure if that is streetwise Helsinki or just 
idealized Helsinki, but that is fundamentally the approach I would 
espouse. I want to comment on the $1 billion because I think it is 
of interest to the audience. Nicaragua has in fact asked the Court 
for damages in the amount of $9 billion.84 To my knowledge, the 
largest amount the Court has given to date is about $100 million. 85 
Even assuming that the judgment is not anywhere near $9 billion, 
but is closer to $1 billion, I have not seen any evidence of U.S. 
support for payment of even the lesser amount. In fact, if the Court 
83 See Helsinki Final Act, supra note 29, at 1293-95 (recognizing the "sovereign equality 
... inviolability of frontiers ... [and] territorial integrity" of the states of Europe). 
84 In its pleadings filed with the I.C.J. before the June, 1986judgment, Nicaragua prayed 
immediate relief of $320 million, with leave to present evidence at a later date elaborating 
further damages. Nicar. v. U.S., 1986 I.C.J. at 20. 
85 In fact, the only I.C.]. judgment awarding damages was in The Corfu Channel Case, 
where the Court awarded the United Kingdom £843,947 (about $2.1 million at the then 
prevailing exchange rate). 1949 I.C.]. at 250; see also C. GRAY, supra note 33, at 84. 
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were to award any amount of judgment, Congress would probably 
amend the Tucker Act86 tomorrow to prevent Nicaragua from being 
able to sue in the Court of Claims and collect the judgment. That 
is my assessment of the political reality, which means that we really 
do have to pursue some kind of settlement. It may not be the best 
option for strengthening the Court, but it is certainly better than 
flouting its authority altogether. I would say, however, that I like 
your scenario of folding a settlement into a larger political, eco-
nomic and social process. 
Thomas Farer: At the very beginning of the present conflict in Cen-
tral America, I took the position that it was implausible to imagine 
that the United States would adopt a strictly non-interventionist 
stance. Even if one thought such a stance was ideal, it remained 
unachievable. Consequently, persons like myself, who were opposed 
to the general direction of U.S. policy, had to make suggestions 
about other policies the United States could actively pursue. The 
United States is not a tired country. It is a country with sometimes 
vagrant and always powerful evangelical impulses. You take your 
country as you find it, and try to channel its energy and enthusiasm 
in a preferred direction. 
What Professor Franck proposes is an institutionalization of a 
proposal that I made in several different forums and in some of 
my writings in the early 1980s. My suggestion was to avoid isolating 
Nicaragua as we isolated Cuba. The one indisputable thing you can 
say about the effort to isolate Cuba is that it does not appear to 
have done much to advance any evident U.S. objectives.87 Rather 
than isolating Nicaragua, thereby encouraging or at least facilitating 
the practice of an anti-democratic vocation, we should smother it 
with largesse. We should fill the country with Venezuelan doctors, 
Spanish professors and teachers, and Canadian agricultural experts. 
We should also select people from the universities in Nicaragua and 
bring them here, rather than banning them because of their leftist 
associations.88 We should take advantage of Nicaragua's openness 
86 Tucker Act, 24 Stat. 505 (1888) (codified at scattered sections of28 U.S.C.) (act limiting 
U.S. liability for foreign claims). 
87 See G. HUFFBAUER & J. SCHOTT, supra note 68 (discussing the effectiveness of economic 
embargo of Cuba). 
88 The Attorney General or the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) may deny 
visas to visiting aliens if either the Attorney General or INS "knows or has reason to believe 
[the alien] seek[s] to enter the United States solely, principally or incidentally to engage in 
activities which would be prejudicial to the public interest." 8 U .S.C. § 1182(27) (1982). In 
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to outside contact, exploiting it in order to promote pluralism in all 
its manifestations: economic, political and social. What Professor 
Franck is suggesting, in effect, is a multilateral framework in which 
such a program might be done. 
I do not think that there can be a real easing of tension among 
Central American states without security guaranties. These include, 
regrettably, an acceptance of the legitimacy of all Central American 
regimes: the left-wing regimes, the crypto-fascist regimes and those 
that are somewhere in between. They also include a guarantee 
against external involvement in the region by extra-hemispheric 
powers. 89 
One problem, of course, is that the societies of Central America 
are really quite different. In theory, each of the countries is com-
plying with the Arias Plan and engaging in negotiations with its 
opponents.90 In fact, that is not the case. In Guatemala, there is a 
ruling group which is committed to a society and government pro-
foundly antithetical to our values, a group that sustains itself with 
very limited assistance from the United States.91 What would they 
be prepared to agree to? Guatemala is probably a hopeless case, 
unless we are prepared to intervene far more deeply than anyone 
on the left, the center, or the right of the American political spec-
trum would find congenial. To a considerable extent, the same is 
true in EI Salvador. There again, there is a very small group of 
people in control of the society, people with harsh, right-wing, anti-
democratic views.92 
Nevertheless, it is conceivable that one could develop a nor-
mative framework for the region. After all, if we were able to 
fashion a relationship between Eastern Europe and Western Eu-
1983 the INS invoked § 1182(27) to deny an entry visa to the Nicaraguan Minister of the 
Interior, Tomas Borge. Visa Denials on Ideological Grounds: An Update (Report of the 
Committee on Immigration and Nationality Law of the Association of the Bar of the City of 
New York), reprinted in 8 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 249, 254 (1985). 
89 Exclusion of extra-hemispheric powers from the Americas has been a fixture of U.S. 
foreign policy since the promulgation of the Monroe Doctrine. See James Monroe, Annual 
Address to Congress, AM. STATE PAPERS, 5 FOREIGN REL. 250 (Dec. 2, 1823). While supporters 
of the Monroe Doctrine see it as means of protecting the common interests of the nations of 
the Western Hemisphere, detractors consider the doctrine a pretext for U.S. hegemony and 
interventionism. See generally Note, The Monroe Doctrine in the 1980s: 1nternational Law, Uni-
lateral Policy, or Atavistic Anachronism, 13 CASE W.J. INT'L L. 203 (1981). 
90 See Guatemala Peace Plan, supra note 26, at § 10. 
91 In 1980 the U.S. provided $2.25 million in military assistance to Guatemala. 2 M. 
MCCLINTOCK, supra note 38, at 108. 
92 See generally AMERICAS WATCH, supra note 39 (describing human rights abuses in El 
Salvador). 
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rope, then we could do the same for Central America and the 
United States. Everyone would agree to a set of values, and indeed, 
nominally everyone already has. They are all subject to the Amer-
ican Convention on Human Rights.93 So in a sense, the norms are 
in place. What you are proposing now is that we marshal some 
carrots, which are at the same time sticks, in order to encourage 
movement towards the realization of these norms, and doing it in 
a multi-lateral rather than purely unilateral fashion. 
Several important European and North American states are 
interested in Central America including Spain, the United King-
dom, France, Canada and the United States. There are also a certain 
number of countries in this hemisphere which are either democratic 
or which purport to be democratic such as Mexico, Brazil, Argen-
tina, Venezuela and Columbia. A concerted effort by these countries 
could promote democracy by employing a range of non-violent 
instruments more in the nature of carrots than sticks. 
Jonathan Charney: Anne-Marie Burley mentioned my statement that 
the United States should pay the damages if awarded. My point is 
that the U.S. is obligated legally to pay if damages are awarded.94 
The U.S. should, if at all possible, avoid being subjected to such 
judgment and should, in any event, seek a way to get a settlement 
that would avoid placing it in violation of any judgment. I would 
prefer, of course, that there be no payment and that there be no 
award. Realistically speaking, a damages award is a long shot. If 
you look at the record of the International Court of Justice, as 
Christine Grey did, in her book Judicial Remedies in International 
Law,95 it appears that Nicaragua is unlikely to get state damages 
awarded for anything other than actual damages.96 Therefore, I 
think that Nicaragua will be well advised to settle. 
93 American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969 (unpublished); see Report of 
the U.S. Delegation to the Inter-American Specialized Conference on Human Rights, 9 INT'L 
LEGAL MATERIALS 711 (1970) (relating the contents of the Convention, which gave the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights the power to investigate human rights abuses in 
the Americas). 
94 There is disagreement among scholarly writers as to whether damages are a proper 
remedy for direct injury to a state by another state. While the I.C.]. awarded damages in 
The Corfu Channel Case, international arbitral tribunals have tended to award such damages 
only when the injury is to the nationals of the complaining state. See C. GRAY, supra note 33, 
at 85-92. 
95 C. GRAY, supra note 33. 
96 [d. at 85-92. 
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On the Helsinki issue, I am confident that the U.S. liberal 
democratic tradition will continue to influence the conduct of its 
international relations. As Professor Franck mentioned, we see 
winds of change both in international relations and within socialist 
systems. I think that it is very possible that given the right environ-
ment, such changes may be nurtured even in Central America. 
Surely, the use of force is undesirable in its own right. It un-
dermines and corrupts the liberal democratic tradition. Systems like 
what Professor Franck has proposed may be very idealistic and may 
not be attainable in fact. I am more optimistic that we are going to 
reach a political-military stalemate in the region as a result of the 
exhaustion of the parties, if for no other reason. Perhaps this will 
be acceptable to the United States and the other players, although 
it is not ideal. 
B. Measuring Damages in Nicaragua v. United States 
Thomas Franck: One question which I raised at the beginning which 
has not yet been addressed is the measure of damages claimed by 
Nicaragua. As Anne-Marie Burley has said, Nicaragua has asked 
for $9 billion. Such an extreme measure of damages will open up 
set-off claims by the U.S. that would be permitted by the Court 
should they fit within its decision on the merits. The Court's decision 
at least opens the door for the U.S. to argue that Nicaragua supplied 
the EI Salvador insurgents.97 Since the Court, in its judgment, en-
tertained that as a possible finding of fact,98 but did not make a 
clear determination on the issue, there remains the possibility of 
the set-off being effectively argued. Should the litigation continue 
to the damages phase, I also think the Court will have to appoint 
masters to determine the appropriate measure of damages.99 The 
masters will have to spend a substantial amount of time at the scene 
trying to get a sense of what the actual damages are. The necessity 
of appointing masters becomes clearer when considering the Nicar-
aguan claim, which includes everything that has happened to the 
97 See Nicar v. U.S. (Merits), 1986 I.C.]. at 82 ("support for the armed opposition in El 
Salvador from Nicaraguan territory was a fact up to the early months of 1981"); see also id. 
at 87 ("certain transborder military incursions into Honduras and Costa Rica are imputable 
to the Government of Nicaragua"). 
98 See supra note 25. 
99 Masters have been appointed only once to consider the question of damages in a case 
before the I.C.]. See The Corfu Channel Case, 1949 I.C.]. at 249; see also C. GRAY, supra note 
33, at 82. 
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Nicaraguan economy over the last five years. IOO This raises the 
prospect of large damage settlements from the Court. 
Jonathan Charney: That the case even came to the World Court, and 
the Court decided to hear the case are both troubling. I am in favor 
of some sort of negotiated settlement between the United States 
and Nicaragua. A settlement may be more palatable to the United 
States if the damages could be funnelled to an entity other than 
Nicaragua. I think, however, the American people traditionally have 
more trouble with international bureaucracy than they do with 
international law and international courts. IOI In international situ-
ations, many Americans want to keep the focus of decision-making 
in the United States. There is also an inherent American distrust 
of government, whether that government be in Albany or in Wash-
ington or in any foreign capital. So, I am suspicious of international 
commissions and how well they work within the American experi-
ence. They may work better in Europe, where international bu-
reaucracy is more of a settled expectation of the peoples. The 
differences between the cultures and the societies of the United 
States and Latin America also affect whether or not those commis-
sions could work as well here as they do in Europe. 
Mark Janis: The first point concerning the Helsinki model is that 
there is some degree of Nicaraguan interest in that kind of model 
because it tries to develop Central American regional unity. To the 
extent the United States government is interested, the plan could 
be a practical one. The second point is that intervention is not a 
bad idea, because every country does it and it is certainly accepted 
to a certain extent. 102 The problem traditionally has been how we 
define intervention and what result we want to see from it. In the 
context of Nicaragua and other Latin American countries, we look 
at it primarily as a question of allowing a middle class pluralistic 
government to emerge. And in Nicaragua, I assume, this would 
ensure that there is an opposition press, opposition radio stations 
100 See Nicar. v. u.s. (Merits), 1986 I.e.j. at 8-9. 
101 Popular American frustration with the operation of international bureaucracy is 
evident in the public perception of the United Nations. See, e.g., Franck, U.S. Foreign Policy 
and the U.N., 14 DEN. j. INT'L L. & POL. 159, 168 (1986) (quoting Sen. Steven Symms (R-
Idaho), who stated that "taxpayers are sick and tired of playing host to our enemies and 
critics abroad." N.Y. Times, Sept. 23, 1983, at A7, col. 1). 
102 See generally Damrosch, Politics, supra note 34 (discussing international acceptance of 
non-military modes of intervention). 
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and possibly an opposition television station. In addition, we should 
encourage land reform, workers cooperatives and the kinds of eco-
nomic institutions which could revitalize some of these countries 
and change their economic base. These aspects, although worth-
while, have sometimes been ignored. 
With respect to the damage award, I think it very unlikely that 
any administration is going to litigate the measure of damages. If 
we did, my hunch would be that the Court would be loathe to 
reopen the issue of what happened in El Salvador, because it would 
raise the very problems which I feel the Court attempted to sidestep 
in its original opinion. For that reason, I think the only viable option 
is settlement. 
VIII. COMMENTS AND QUESTIONS FROM MEMBERS 
OF THE AUDIENCE 
A. The I.C]. Lacked Jurisdiction Over the Suit 
Myres McDougal: 103 Mr. Chairman, this panel has been so grossly 
imbalanced, I hope that you will give me time enough to redress 
this imbalance. I might say that I was at one time counsel to our 
government on the jurisdictional phase of this Nicaraguan case. I 
do not purport to speak for the government; I am speaking only 
for myself and for the common interest. I feel that this panel was 
in fantasy land. 
I would like to take the outline posited by Anne-Marie Burley 
and reverse it by beginning with the Nicaraguan case, coming back 
to the security problem and then ultimately addressing the domestic 
issues. There were five grounds upon which the Court should have 
held it had no jurisdiction. 104 It created a jurisdiction that did not 
exist by the most fictitious means. One of the justices, for example, 
dreamed up the notion that by joining the United Nations, Nica-
ragua impliedly ratified a League of Nations convention which al-
103 Myres Smith McDougal is the Emeritus Sterling Professor of Law at Yale Law School; 
B.C.L., 1930 Oxford Univ.; ].S.D., 1931, Yale; LL.B., 1935, Mississippi; LL.D., 1966, North-
western; LL.D., 1970, York Univ. (Canada). Professor McDougal is a past president of the 
American Association of International Law and the American Association of Law Schools. 
Since admission to the bar in 1935, Professor McDougal has represented the United States 
in a number of international matters, the most recent being the jurisdictional phase of the 
Nicaragua case. 
104 See generally 1984 I.C.]. Pleadings 1 (listing U.S. objections to I.C.]. jurisdiction). 
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lowed it to sue before the World Court. 105 Nicaragua, however, 
disappeared from the League of Nations two years before the doc-
ument was framed and never signed it.l06 Such a theory could not 
possibly have been anything other than a fictitious, question-begging 
way of creating a non-existent standing to sue. 
The Court had no jurisdiction, the United States never con-
sented to such jurisdiction, and Nicaragua had no standing to sue. 
When an international court, arbitral tribunal, or other interna-
tional body renders a decision that it has no competence to render, 
the parties have no moral or legal obligation to obey it.107 So when 
you talk about the United States making compensation or entering 
into negotiations with Nicaragua, you are just dreaming. The judg-
ment is a nullity. 
Let us now turn to the merits of the case. Since I have written 
a thousand-page book with Feliciano on aggression and self-de-
fense,108 I think I know the history of this area of international law. 
In contrast to that history, take the statement of the Court on the 
merits with respect to both aggression and self-defense. Rather than 
take into account Nicaragua's expansive totalitarianism, the opinion 
took a completely neutral view of the Sandinista regime. 109 The 
Court wanted to have law that comprehended both expansive to-
talitarianism and non-totalitarianism. As a consequence, the opinion 
could not take into account a lot of the considerations that had 
moved the United States to intervene in Nicaragua. It did, however, 
proceed to honor the Russian notion of "wars of liberation," and to 
disparage older doctrines of self-defense in unprecedented fash-
ion. llo The Court's unjustified support for "wars of liberation," was 
105 Nicar. v. u.s. (Merits), 1986 I.C.]. at 161-62 (opinion of Lachs, ].). Nicaragua failed 
to ratify the Protocol of Adherence to the Statute of the Permanent Court of International 
Justice in 1939, but Justice Lachs believed that Nicaragua had validly accepted thejurisdiction 
of the court by having sent a telegram informing the court of Nicaragua's intention to ratify 
the protocol. [d. 
106 See Nicar. v. U.S. (jurisdiction), 1984 I.C.]. 392,400 (judgment Uurisdiction] of Nov. 
26) (Nicaragua never signed the protocol of adherence to mandatory jurisdiction of the 
Permanent International Court of Justice, which signing would have made Nicaragua subject 
to the jurisdiction of the I.C.].). 
107 Cf c. GRAY, supra note 33, at 59 (effectiveness of remedies awarded by the I.C.]. 
hinges on the existence of jurisdiction). 
108 M. McDOUGAL & F. FELICIANO, LAW AND MINIMUM WORLD PUBLIC ORDER (1961) 
(proposing a legal and conceptual framework for adjudication of war and aggression in 
international law). 
109 See, e.g., Nicar. v. U.S. (Merits), 1986 I.C.]. at 134-35 (the Court did not find, as the 
u.s. alleged, that Nicaragua violated its citizens' human rights and further stated that such 
violations, had they existed, would not constitute a valid pretext for the U.S. intervention). 
110 [d. at 122-23 (in the absence of evidence of armed attack of EI Salvador by Nicaragua, 
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pointed out in Judge Schwebel's very eloquent dissent. lll The ma-
jority first said that, despite the staging of hostilities against EI 
Salvador from Nicaragua and the existence of an organization in 
Nicaragua sending people, goods and direction into EI Salvador, 
Nicaragua's actions did not amount to armed attack.ll2 Having ad-
vocated a fictitious notion of what constitutes armed attack, the 
Court turned to the allegedly literal words of Article 51 113 and held 
that the United States was not authorized to assist in the defense of 
EI Salvador.114 This ruling clearly adopted the Russian notion that 
Article 24115 does not apply to wars of liberation. 116 
Turning to the question that Ms. Burley raised, you have two 
complementary sets of doctrines. On one side of the doctrinal struc-
ture you have this nonsense about sovereignty and non-interven-
tion. On the other side you have the notions of self-defense, regional 
self-defense, coming to the assistance of other people, and main-
tenance of public order. In any particular instance, the Court or 
decision-maker has to decide which side of this doctrine it is going 
to take. You cannot just piously say "I am against intervention, I 
believe in sovereignty." You are talking through your hat if you do, 
or at least you are talking in a fantasy world that has nothing to do 
the Court found that the doctrine of collective self-defense did not justify U.S. aid to the 
Contras), but see id. at 348-49 (Schwebel, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court, by criticizing 
U.S. intervention while tacitly condoning Nicaragua's support for the Salvadoran rebels, 
impliedly ratified the Soviet notion of valid communist "wars of liberation"). 
111 [d. at 348-49. 
112 See id. at 122-23. 
113 CHARTER OF THE U.N., art. 51 (1945) states: 
Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or 
collective self-defense if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United 
Nations, until the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to maintain 
international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this 
right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall 
not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under 
the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order 
to maintain or restore international peace and security. 
114 Nicar. v. U.S. (Merits), 1986 I.C.]. at 122-23. 
115 CHARTER OF THE U.N., art. 24, provides: 
1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members 
confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of inter-
national peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this 
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf. 
2. In discharging these duties the Security Council shall act in accordance with the 
purposes and principles of the United Nations .... 
3. The Security Council shall submit annual, and when necessary, special reports to 
the General Assembly for its consideration. 
116 See Nicar. v. U.S. (Merits), 1986 I.C.J. at 348-49 (Schwebel, J., dissenting). 
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with the real world. Looking at the real world, notwithstanding Mr. 
Gorbachev's talk the other day, we have two contending systems of 
world order. On one side is expansive totalitarianism. On the other 
side is the United States and the free world, which regardless of its 
evils aspires toward freedom and human dignity for all peoples. I 
happen to think that our attitudes prompt us to a good deal more 
than aspiration. In the real world, international law has to be framed 
to take these contending systems into account. I am not criticizing 
the International Court of Justice because it made law. Many of you 
know I was born in the America of legal realists. ll7 I know that 
decision-makers have to make law. The question, however, is 
whether or not they make law in the common interest of humanity 
or against the common interest. It is awfully hard to find the com-
mon interest of expansive totalitarianism on one side and a public 
order aspiring towards human freedom and dignity on the other. 
It is extraordinarily difficult for the Court to make law in the 
common interest. Nevertheless, the internal domestic affairs and 
internal structures of the different parties to the suit are subject to 
the overriding rules and policies of international law. This word 
sovereignty is a meaningless noise. Any international law restricts 
the freedom of states to behave and do things that they want to do. 
Any doctrines of international law cut down the doctrines of non-
intervention and all their synonyms and the mushrooms that grow 
around them. In the light of this whole factual context, the question 
is whether the United States was justified in taking measures to 
assist EI Salvador in its effort to be free of expansive totalitarianism. 
The U.S. action could be supported by the doctrines of collective 
self-defense, liS the coming to the assistance of a state that is being 
attacked, IJ9 or even other doctrines if you wanted to invoke them. 
I submit to you that if you make a rational choice in terms of the 
common interest of peoples who aspire toward a free world, a world 
of human dignity, you can have only one answer here. The United 
States should take whatever measures are necessary to promote the 
security of Central America against expansive totalitarianism. 120 
Again, Ms. Burley is quite generous when she refers to Nicaragua. 
Il7 See, e.g., J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND (1930) (positing that law cannot be 
certain since courts must be able to change the law to accommodate the complexity of human 
relations). 
118 See, e.g., CHARTER OF THE U.N. at art. 51, supra note 39; see also id., at art. I, para. 1. 
119Id. at art. 51. 
120 See, e.g., J. KIRKPATRICK, supra note 32, at 49-52 (drawing the distinction between 
totalitarian and authoritarian dictatorships). 
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We all know as a matter of fact that the Sandinistas were trained in 
Cuba and Moscow, and, by a naked power play, dispossessed the 
people who had been trying to rule the country after running out 
the dictator. To call that regime "Nicaragua" is just another fiction. 
People who believe in freedom and human rights should not be 
misled by this. I see you are getting anxious, Mr. Chairman, but I 
hope you will understand and remember what I have said. 
Thomas Franck: Thank you Professor McDougal. I think we ought 
to take a few more comments from the floor. I would like to urge 
the audience to tolerate the assumptions which I stated at the be-
ginning of the session. We are not a panel to reargue either the 
jurisdiction or the merits of the Nicaraguan case. We have instead 
assumed that when the United States ratified the Charter of the 
United Nations 121 and the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice,122 it made a treaty commitment that it would abide by the 
jurisdictional choice. We are proceeding on the assumption that we 
ought to discuss what is required to put us back into compliance 
with the obligations which the Court has imposed upon us. We 
wanted deliberately to suspend a rehearing of all the arguments 
pertaining to the merits of the case, just as at one point in the 
history of the United States it was useful to talk about what could 
be done about integrating schools rather than to argue about 
whether the decision of the Supreme Court in Brown v. Board of 
Education 123 was unconstitutional. 
B. Resettlement of the Contras 
Michael Glennon: 124 I could not help noting that the panel did not 
address the questions Professor Franck asked earlier concerning the 
possible resettlement of the Contras in a post-military period. I 
would like to make a modest suggestion as to what such a settlement 
might look like. It seems to me a terrible waste of resources to allow 
these representatives of a public order aspiring to human dignity 
121 U.N. CHARTER, June 26,1945,59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993. 
122 STATUTE OF THE I. C.]. , June 26, 1945,59 Stat. 1031, T.S. No. 993. 
123 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
124 Michael J. Glennon is a Professor of Law at the University of Cincinnati Law School; 
B.A., 1970, ColI. of St. Thomas; J.D., 1973, Minnesota. Professor Glennon was a member of 
the Committee on Jurisdiction of the I.C.]. and is on the Board of Editors of the American 
Journal of International Law. 
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and freedom, the moral equals of our Founding Fathers,125 to dis-
sipate without exposing us to their ideals. It seems to me it would 
be fair to resettle them in the congressional districts represented by 
those who have consistently voted for Contra aid. They might be 
able to participate in good government organizations and lead Boy 
Scout Troops and civic organizations in readings on Locke, Rous-
seau and Montesquieu. We talked last night about our special issue 
of the American Journal of International Law commemorating the 
Bicentennial of the Constitution. Perhaps Professor McDougal 
could use his influence to persuade Colonel Bermudez to submit a 
piece on the Constitution and humanitarian law. 
C. Mining Nicaraguan Harbors Was an International Tort 
Anthony D'Amato: 126 Looking at the damages question, while all of 
you are bothered by a nine billion dollar settlement, I was taken 
aback when Professor Charney said he did not want to pay anything. 
It seems to me that the International Law Association ought to 
recognize that the mining of the harbors of Nicaragua was an 
international tort by the United States. It was a tort committed 
against a country with which we had a treaty of peace, amity and 
cooperation. 127 We mined the harbors surreptitiously and caused 
Nicaragua damage. For us not to pay at least an amount equal to 
the damage caused by the mining would be a horrendous precedent. 
Irrespective of what you think about the Nicaragua case, or the 
International Court of Justice, I think that there is a minimum 
measure of damages below which we ought not countenance going. 
D. Negotiation Strategies for Nicaragua 
Richard Bilderl28 : Like a number of the panelists, I have always been 
very intrigued by Jonathan Charney'S suggestion that settlement is 
125 In a speech given on March I, 1985 before the Conservative Political Action Confer-
ence, President Reagan called the Contras the "moral equals of our Founding Fathers." N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 2, 1985, at AI, col. 1. 
126 Anthony M. D'Amato is a Professor of Law at Northwestern Law School; A.B., 1958, 
Cornell; J.D., 1961, Harvard; Ph.D., 1968, Columbia. Professor D'Amato is a teacher of 
international law and a member of the Board of Editors of the American Journal of International 
Law. 
127 Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation, June 21, 1867, United States-
Nicaragua, 15 Stat. 549, T.S. No. 257. 
128 Richard B. Bilder is the Burrus-Bascom Professor of Law at the University of Wis-
consin Law School; B.A., 1949, Williams Coli.; J.D., 1956, Harvard. Professor Bilder is a 
member of the U.S. Institute of Human Rights and is on the Board of Editors of the American 
Journal of International Law. 
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the solution to the problem. Therefore I just want to raise a question 
which you might find of interest and perhaps some of the panelists 
might want to address. I also think that the best way out of this for 
Nicaragua, the United States and the whole international commu-
nity is an eventual settlement of this matter, using the hostages 
case 129 as a precedent. I am very disturbed by the fact that the case 
is moving on toward a decision on damages. Will moving on to the 
damage phase make an eventual settlement politically harder or 
easier for the parties? Let me put it another way. Assume you are 
advising Nicaragua. A happier result, perhaps under the future 
U.S. administration, might come after next year. Would you counsel 
Nicaragua to try to delay a push for a quick judgment, or would 
you counsel an aggressive stance to enhance its negotiating powers? 
I am not sure which way it cuts. If you were a member of the Court 
and wished to have some happy results for the Court, for the United 
States and for Nicaragua, would you perhaps try and find some 
way of delaying or putting off this issue until the possibilities of 
settlement might at least have been more fully explored under a 
new administration? Finally, is it possible to have a settlement, or is 
the machinery already grinding on so we do not have any more 
options? 
Thomas Franck: Anne-Marie Burley, why don't you and Jonathan 
Charney have a go at that question. Then let us go back to the 
audience for some more questions. Incidentally, one part of the 
answer to your question is, of course, the Masters Appointment 
process130 which I referred to a few minutes ago. If Masters are 
appointed by the Court there is going to be several years of fact 
finding. 
Anne-Marie Burley: I would like to start with that last point. Yesterday 
I spent some time talking to one of the lawyers for Nicaragua who 
told me that the Court is actually in no hurry at all to proceed to 
the damages phase. In fact, the Court is really opening the door as 
widely and discretely as it can to allow other proceedings to inter-
vene. I think it is important that the damage phase be postponed 
as long as possible. I do not think that the Court is going to take 
the initiative if the parties do not. 
129 u.s. v. Iran, 1980 I.e.]. 3. 
130 See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
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Just very briefly, and mindful of Professor Franck's injunction 
not to reopen some of the issues, I want to refurbish the Court's 
reputation. I think it is worth pointing out that Justice Schwebel 
voted against the United States on the mining question,l3l and that 
the votes on the big questions of U.S. responsibility for intervening 
in Nicaragua and direct action were twelve to three. 132 The only 
judge who voted with the United States all the way through was 
Judge Oda, the Japanesejudge. 133 Otherwise, in the majority against 
the United States were the French judge, the Italian judge, the 
Swedish judge, which rebuts the image of a highly politicized 
Court. 134 It is also worth pointing out that the Court did, to the 
extent it could, take account of evidence that the United States 
would have submitted had it participated,135 particularly, a State 
Department publication entitled Revolution Beyond Borders. 136 More-
over, the Court did conclude that the United States was not respon-
sible for the Contra atrocities. 137 
One final point regarding Professor Glennon's suggestion 
about what to do with the Contras, an issue that we have not really 
addressed. I want to raise an interesting legal issue. The Court, as 
I said, held that the United States was not ultimately responsible 
for everything the Contras did because it did not have entire control 
over them. 138 That will be an issue in the damages phase. The 
question of how much control the U.S. exerted over the Contras 
and what the measure of damages should be is intimately linked. I 
would suggest that anything that we do now with respect to the 
Contras, for example accepting responsibility for relocating them, 
potentially weakens the U.S. position in the damages phase. 
Jonathan Charney: Let me make two comments regarding Professor 
McDougal's statement and then go on to Professor Bilder's question. 
131 In fact, Justice Schwebel determined that the mining was illegal to the extent it 
affected countries other than Nicaragua. Nicar. v. U.S. (Merits), 1986 I.C.]. at 379-80 
(Schwebel, ]., dissenting). 
132Id. at 148-49 (finding by a vote of twelve to three that 1) the U.S. breached its treaty 
of friendship with Nicaragua; 2) that the U.S. was obligated to refrain from further such 
acts; and 3) that the U.S. was liable to make reparations for its actions). 
m See id. at 146-49 (listing the the judges' votes on each issue). 
u4Id. 
135 Id. at 43-45. 
136 See Nicar. v. U.S. (Merits), 1986 I.C.]. at 44. 
I37 Id. at 64 (U.S. funding of the Contras held insufficient to attribute to the U.S. 
responsibility for the illegal acts of the Contras). 
138 Id. at 64-65. 
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On the question of jurisdiction, Professor McDougal did not men-
tion the com promissory clause issue. Only one judge dissented on 
the merits of the decision to find jurisdiction based upon the com-
promissory clause. 139 I think that fact has been ignored by many. 
With respect to the lack of balance on the merits, that is the fault 
of the U.S. It did not put forward its own arguments and evidence 
that might have promoted a more balanced judgment.14o On the 
question of damages, I do not think that satisfaction in international 
law requires a payment of money.141 There are other ways of sat-
isfying international legal wrongs. I agree that the Court ought to 
consider the use of masters and other fact finders, but for no other 
reason than to delay the final disposition and to give diplomacy 
more of a chance. I think it is very important that we seek a settle-
ment. The Court has telegraphed its interest in delaying the judg-
ment on the merits. The Court also recognized at the merits phase 
that its role is to encourage a settlement,142 and I think it will 
continue to do that. A damages award, however, would place an 
obstacle in the way of settlement on both sides. I remember about 
two years ago, there was a short article in The New York Times 
about an effort by Albania to reestablish diplomatic relations with 
the U.K.143 The first issue on the agenda was the unpaid damages 
award that arose out of the Corfu Channel case. 144 The damages issue 
will likewise hang over the United States for a long time. In fact, 
the damages award would increase the leverage of Nicaragua out 
of proportion to its political and military power. I think its hand 
would be strengthened in any settlement negotiation conducted 
after such an award were rendered. 
E. The Willingness of the United States to Intervene in Other Nations 
Leonard Boudin: 145 In a sense, I agree with Professor McDougal that 
there is a lack of balance of the panel, but it is imbalanced the other 
139 [d. at 149; see Charney, Compromissory Clauses, supra note 45. 
140 See note 51, supra. 
141 See supra note 94; see generally C. GRAY, supra note 33, at 82-92. 
142 Nicar. v. U.S. (Merits), 1986 I.C.]. at 149 (stating the unanimous opinion of the Court 
that "both [p]arties [should] seek a solution to their disputes by peaceful means in accordance 
with international law."). 
143 Binder, A Peek Behind the Albanian Curtain, N.V. Times, Oct. 5, 1985, p. 5, col. 1. 
144 The Corfu Channel Case, 1949 ICJ at 244 (Merits) (assessment of compensation due 
from Albania to the United Kingdom). 
145 Leonard Boudin (1912-1989) was an attorney noted for his practice in civil liberties 
law. Mr. Boudin represented such varied clients as Julian Bond, Paul Robeson, Benjamin 
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way. I have never seen a group of scholars make so vigorous an 
effort to work out some way to save face for the United States. To 
propose both a Helsinki plan of some kind, which has been disre-
garded by the United States for decades, and an arbitral group to 
sit on the decision of the International Court of Justice is antithetical 
to the rule of law. I do not like to engage in political debate, but I 
think there is a sense of unrealism in the panel. The panel disre-
gards the whole history of the United States in Latin America. The 
problem is with the United States. What concerns me particularly 
in view of both the imminent election of George Bush and the 
attitude of the American people, is that we are not changing our 
mood in terms of our sense of power in what is sometimes called 
the "American Lake." Finally, I would point out that the discussion 
here has been to a large degree about military action in Central 
America, which of course, has resulted in terrible injuries and 
deaths. But when I consider the U.S. economic embargo of Cuba, 
and think of the economic injury that we have caused Cuba since 
1963, it clearly demonstrates how we are able to crush a particular 
country. In any discussions we have in the future, the interference 
with a country's fundamental right to survive caused by U.S. eco-
nomic sanctions ought to be considered. 
F. Politicization of the I.C]. and Enforcibility of Awards at 
International Law 
Edward Gordon: 146 I would like to begin with an illustrative example 
of why I think this panel spoke with something less than precision. 
You referred to the "Japanese judge" on the Court and the "Swedish 
judge" on the Court, thus emulating Davis Robinson, who e~ployed 
such terminology to illustrate the politicization of the Court.147 
Those people, however, do not sit on the Court as representatives 
of their respective countries. The justices sit independently of na-
tional affiliation. 148 Robinson's view simply fosters the damaging 
Spock, Daniel Ellsberg, and the governments of Cuba and Nicaragua. Mr. Boudin died 
November 26, 1989. 
146 Edward M. Gordon is a Professor of Law at Albany Law School; B.S., 1960, Penn-
sylvania; LL.B., 1963, Yale; Diploma in International Law, 1965, Cambridge Univ. Professor 
Gordon is an instructor in Constitutional Law and Foreign Relations and is on the Advisory 
Committee of The International Lawyer. 
147 See generally Robinson, Should the United States Reconsider Its Acceptance of World Court 
Jurisdiction?, AM. SOC'y INT'L L. PROC., April, 1985, at 95. 
148 STATUTE OF THE I.C.]., art. 16 provides that "no member of the Court may exercise 
any political ... function .... " Article 20 further states that "each member of the Court 
shall ... exercise his [sic) powers impartially and conscientiously." See also note 63, supra. 
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illusion that particular decisions of the Court are simply replications 
of what the General Assembly would do in a particular context. 
On the other assumptions of the panel, I think there is also 
something less then precision. For example, it takes a great leap of 
logic to proceed from the proposition that you must comply with 
an award of the Court to' the conclusion that it must be done 
promptly. If you are all saying that prompt, adequate and effective 
compliance is the world community standard for complying with 
an international obligation, then it might be worthwhile for the 
United States to pay the award promptly and adequately to establish 
that principle. Our Supreme Court, however, is on record as saying 
that, at least in the context of the expropriation of alien owned 
property, it could not find to its satisfaction the existence of such a 
consensus in the world community on the basis of prior practice. 
That finding has a larger implication in the context of a settlement. 
All of you who talked about paying the award as part of a larger 
settlement were talking in an immediate context; but why? Why not 
a long term settlement? And why not one involving the Soviet Union 
and all the principal actors in the drama in Central America? 
As to the notion that international awards must be paid 
promptly, as opposed to other kinds of international claims, I think 
you would find it hard in actual state practice to find a consensus 
on that point. How quickly did the Soviet Union comply with the 
1962 advisory opinion on certain expenses?149 Under the best of 
constructions it took 26 years, and that is not an aberration. 150 The 
claims desks of foreign offices throughout the world are filled with 
unpaid claims a generation or two later. So far as I am aware, there 
is no practice to back up the assumption that awards against gov-
ernments under international law must be complied with promptly. 
That being so, I see a great many contexts over the next twenty 
years in which the United States could pay this award, not lose face 
and, if inflation goes the way it may go over the next twenty years, 
pay an award which is not terribly expensive in real dollar terms. 
G. Set-Offs Against the I.C.]. Judgment 
L.F. Goldie: 151 I would like a small point clarified. Professor Franck 
mentioned the possibility of set-offs against a judgment predicated 
149 See Certain Expenses of the United Nations, 1962 I.e.]. 150 (Advisory Opinion of 
July 20) (holding that U.N. members were not entitled to withhold funding for U.N. activities 
which they oppose). 
150 Only in 1988 did the Soviet Union express its willingness to fund U.N. activities with 
which it does not agree. See A Real World Court, supra note 16. 
151 L.F. Goldie is a Professor of Law and Director of the International Legal Studies 
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upon infiltration from Nicaragua to EI Salvador. If we are talking 
about United States liability, how can that be set-off when the Court 
stated that there is no legal predicate for our actions under Article 
51 ?152 It seems to me that there is no legal basis for the United 
States to claim any set-off. Would a set-off be a third party claim 
through EI Salvador, provided it was recognized by the Court and 
not glossed over, as I believe it was, in the judgment? 
Thomas Franck: I was only trying to elicit some comments on whether 
it is permissible to argue in the Court that Nicaragua provided 
supplies, training and other facilities for the EI Salvador insurgency. 
Nicaragua claims that everything that has gone wrong with its econ-
omy is because of the Contras. 153 We could claim that a large part 
of our expenses in keeping the EI Salvador economy afloat were 
due to the fact that we had to fight an insurgency and help the EI 
Salvador government which requested this aid. 
IX. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
Thomas Franck: I think we might now ask each of the members of 
the panel to give us some concluding wisdom. 
A. Changing the U.S. Conception of Its Hemispheric Role 
Jules Lobel: I would like to follow-up on what was suggested earlier. 
To discuss enforcement of international law and enforcement of 
this particular judgment is in the present political context an unreal 
exercise unless we consider whether the United States is willing to 
give up a conception of its role in the Western Hemisphere which 
it has held for quite a long time. The most prominent aspect of that 
conception is its refusal to recognize or to accept the legitimacy of 
Marxist regimes in the Western hemisphere irrespective of whether 
they are democratic or undemocratic, whether or not they come to 
power through elections or whether or not they try to influence 
their neighbors. 154 I do not believe that there is a serious challenge 
to this conception among the major political forces in the United 
Program at the Syracuse University Law School; B.A., 1941, U.W. Australia; LL.B., 1945; 
LL.M., 1956, U. of Sydney. Professor Goldie is Chairman of the International Law Association 
Committee on Exclusive Economic Zones and is on the Directorate of the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development. 
152 Nicar. v. U.S. (Merits), 19S6 I.C.]. at IIS-23. 
153 See, e.g., id. at IS-20. 
154 See note 64, supra. 
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States political arena. It means that the discussion of international 
law will take place somewhat in an air of unreality. 
Now, what does that mean for our discussion of international 
law? It means that to a certain extent international law must be 
directed at raising that question and continually emphasizing that 
this is an option which we have. We either have the option of a law-
abiding foreign policy or a continuation of a conception of this 
hemisphere which basically conflicts with certain of the main prem-
ises of international law. Once we start from that assumption, we 
could then ask what a law-abiding policy would mean. In that con-
text, if we were willing to recognize the legitimacy of the Nicaraguan 
government, it would be possible to settle this damage award, be-
cause the Nicaraguans are somewhat desperate for U.S. aid not tied 
to undermining their government. If we say we will give them aid 
but channel it only to the middle class opposition parties, I do not 
think Nicaraguans are going to accept that in lieu of damages. I 
think, however, to the extent that we really provided some serious 
aid they probably would settle the damages aspect. The problem is 
that we are unwilling to do so because of the political conceptions 
we have both of Nicaragua and the Western Hemisphere. 
B. Framing a Positive Response to the I.e]. Judgment 
Mark Janis: I would like to go to the question of balance. I think it 
is a rare distinction for a panel to be accused of being unbalanced 
both by Myres McDougal and by Leonard Boudin. It must be the 
very opposite of damning with praise. I think we are unbalanced, 
but I would say that is true of everyone here. There is probably a 
greater commitment to international law and a greater belief in 
international law in this group then there would be anywhere else. 
I would like to return to my ideas about symbolism. Beyond all 
of the particularities of the I.C.]. decision or the Central American 
problems and the American policy towards that region, I think the 
Nicaraguan case has important symbolism, both for the United 
States and for other countries, with respect to international law. If 
you look towards the Jay Treaty arbitrations of 1794155 and the 
155 Treaty of Peace, Amity, Commerce, Navigation, Boundary, Claims and Extradition 
(the Jay Treaty), United States-United Kingdom, Nov. 19, 1794,8 Stat. 116, T.S. No. 105, 
provided for panels of U.S. and British citizens to arbitrate disputes arising from issues not 
resolved in the treaty negotiations. These arbitrations were the prototype for modern inter-
national arbitration. See THE HAGUE, THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 11 (1976); C. 
GRAY, supra note 33, at 5. 
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Alabama arbitrations in 1873,156 both of those arbitrations had sig-
nificant effect upon public attitudes towards what international law 
could accomplish. They were both positive statements. I reckon that 
with the Nicaragua case we are running the risk of a very negative 
statement about international law. It is in our vested interest to see 
if we can dispel the negative. In a way, Professor McDougal was 
one of the commentators who spoke most directly to symbolism. 
His answer is one of someone committed to international law, by 
saying in short, "I am for international law but what the I.C.]. has 
done is not international law," and that is a good and valid sort of 
response. I think what we need to do is not trivialize or make too 
legal or specific the kind of response we suggest as a group to the 
Nicaragua case. The analogies that have been made to other cases 
would be valid for many sorts of discussions, but I think with the 
Nicaragua case we are involved with a matter of high politics. In 
matters of high politics you deal in simplicities and symbolism. It is 
important for the new administration to deal with the Nicaragua 
case in some sort of important and symbolic fashion. There are 
positive and negative aspects of the case. Certainly the discussion 
here among people committed to international law indicates that 
many people feel very fervently and very differently. Whatever the 
response, I think it should be a positive response, one that looks at 
international law and international courts and tries to make some 
sort of positive statement. I gave you my own notion about what 
one possible response should be. I do not think that is the only 
response, but I certainly hope that we as international lawyers will 
help structure that response in such a way as to be a step forward 
for international law and international courts. 
C. Using the Tools of International Law 
jonathan Charney: I do not know what I can add to this, so let me 
try to be brief. We have a political dispute with Nicaragua. Nicara-
gua successfully used the tools of international law against the U.S., 
including litigation in the I.C.]. At this stage I think, at a minimum, 
the United States should improve its strategic use of those tools 
both to advance its interests in this specific dispute as well as to 
156 Treaty of Washington, United States-United Kingdom, May 8, 1871, 18 Stat.(2) 513, 
T.S. No. 133, provided for arbitration of disputes arising from alleged British breaches of 
neutrality during the American Civil War. The effectiveness of these arbitrations led to the 
inclusion of provisions for international arbitration in subsequent treaties. See THE INTER-
NATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE, supra note 155, at 12. 
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strengthen the U.S. role in the promotion of international law and 
peaceful international relations. The U.S. needs to reestablish a 
better relationship with the Court. That could influence the out-
come in the particular case as well as outcomes in future cases. The 
U.S. also needs to resolve the dispute with Nicaragua because the 
U.S. has an interest in a stable Central America. That, of course, 
does not necessarily mean that all states in Central America need 
to be allies. 
D. Restructuring the Framework of International Law 
Thomas Farer: I think Jules Lobel is right to the extent he suggests 
that the United States sees the Caribbean basin, if not all of Latin 
America, as a legitimate sphere of influence. Likewise, the Soviet 
Union sees Eastern Europe as its sphere of influence, India sees the 
Asian subcontinent as its sphere of influence, Indonesia sees the 
Archepelago as its sphere of influence, and so on. i57 The United 
States is far from unique. 
There is evident a tension between the kind of prerogatives 
asserted by states able to project power beyond their frontiers and 
the United Nations Charter framework. i58 A good deal has been 
written about this in the last ten or fifteen years and it will go on 
being written. i59 This scholarship should not make us weep for the 
trees, for it is a tension that we are going to have to find ways to 
live with. The Yale school has tended to dissolve that tension 
through an excessively fluid view of the governing norms. Both 
jurisprudentially and in terms of the ultimate interests of this coun-
try, I think that is undesirable. Rather we should concede that there 
was a normative framework embodied in the U.N. Charter, which 
the United States saw as being useful for its national interest as the 
preeminent satisfied state. We were the principal architects of that 
framework, but in practice it has, from time to time, been somewhat 
inconvenient. We have thus acted like other states in sometimes 
breaking the constraints that we helped to establish. 
The question is not only where do we go from here, but where 
is the system going? Is the Charter framework collapsing before 
our eyes? Are we entering a period of international anarchy un-
precedented since the end of the Second World War? I think the 
157 See generally P. KEAL, UNSPOKEN RULES AND SUPERPOWER DOMINANCE (1983) (discussion 
of the persistence of spheres of influence in the modern world). 
158 See U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, para. 4, supra note 23. 
159 See works collected at note 34, supra. 
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answer to that is no, or at least it is far from clear that we are 
moving in that direction. This is, however, a time when some new 
architectural work needs to be done. I do not believe there is any 
country other than the United States that can perform that archi-
tectural work, even though our economic and military power is 
much reduced. 
Perhaps the Nicaragua case and the Central American crisis, if 
they do nothing else, ought to force us to think about what changes 
in the architecture of the international order are necessary at the 
present time. If we fail to confront this fact, communication among 
states about security issues will become more difficult, behavior will 
become more unpredictable, all at a time when the danger to hu-
manity arising from the spread of high-technology armaments is 
accelerating. Today, as in the past, the U.S. has a powerful interest 
in maintaining a large measure of restraint on the use of force in 
world politics. 
E. The u.s. Should Act Multilaterally 
Anne-Marie Burley: I think that our future policy towards Nicaragua 
is going to be a bellwether. It is a bellwether of whether or not we 
can act multilaterally, whether we can listen to the countries that 
are most directly affected by our actions and try to forge a policy 
that addresses their real concerns rather than our perceptions of 
what their concerns should be. Unfortunately, we are going to have 
a President who announced very proudly this summer that he was 
a unilateralist, and that any country that would give up one iota of 
its sovereignty was crazy.160 Times are changing. We are still the 
single most powerful country in the world, and the latest projections 
I have read indicate we are going to remain so. Even in the year 
2010 our GNP will still be far ahead of our closest rivals. Neverthe-
less, we are no longer powerful enough to single-mindedly pursue 
and get what we think we want. To that extent, I think that carving 
out a legal policy in Nicaragua would be a very positive sign. 
F. Conclusions of the Panel 
Thomas Franck: I have listened very carefully to what I think were 
absolutely splendid presentations by all members of the panel. I 
feel a good deal of pride at having selected this panel and persuaded 
[60 See N.Y. Times, Nov. 2, 1988, at AI, col. 3 (discussing George Bush's rejection of 
multilateral peace initiatives). 
1990] u.s. POllCY IN CENTRAL AMERICA 257 
them to come and talk to us about a topic that was not easy to 
address, that might have been unthinkable even a few months ago. 
In listening to them I thought I heard a certain degree of common 
ground. I thought that the notion that the United States would 
simply stop trying to influence the hemisphere was seen by the 
panel as unrealistic and probably even as undesirable. It was gen-
erally taken for granted that the United States in fact would tolerate 
a Marxist regime in the hemisphere, and that in any event that was 
no longer unthinkable. The notion that the United States would 
cease to support the liberalization of totalitarian regimes of the right 
or the left seemed to most of us unrealistic. That also had to be set-
off against the notion that we would tolerate a Marxist regime. It 
would depend upon what kind of Marxist regime it was. The notion 
that international law prohibits the United States from intervening 
against totalitarian regimes of right or left is generally perceived to 
be wrong. 
I cited Lori Damrosch's forthcoming piece161 just before she 
arrived, and would have called on her to speak if there had not 
been so many on the list already. International law, as Professor 
Damrosch indicates in her forthcoming article, limits the tools which 
may be used. It prefers carrots to sticks, it prohibits specifically 
military sticks, and it prefers multilateral carrots to unilateral car-
rots. 162 The possibility for linking the settlement to regional ma-
chinery with some effective carrots is no longer entirely unthinka-
ble. Ijust came back from a meeting in the Soviet Union. Whenever 
the human rights question came up, the conference broke into an 
angry discourse between the Hungarians and the Romanians. The 
number one human rights issue was what the Hungarians perceived 
the Romanians to be doing to Romanians of Hungarian origin in 
Transylvania. One of the Russian international lawyers at the meet-
ing came over and sort of said in despair, "We really need something 
like the Strasbourg machinery here in Eastern Europe to resolve 
these sort of questions." There are breaks in the horizon and there 
are possibilities to glimpse little bits of sunshine here, rays of hope. 
I am delighted that this panel was able to seize that moment. Per-
haps they, with you in the audience who have asked excellent ques-
tions, demonstrate that there is new thinking here as well. 
161 Damrosch, Politics, supra note 34. 
162 [d. at 5-6. 
